The Student Divestment Movement in the United States and Tactical Diffusion: The Shantytown Protest*

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Abstract

A recent trend in the literature on social movements is the focus on how social movement organizations influence not only their challengers but also other social movement organizations, both in other movements and movements in different countries. This article shows how diffusion theory helps us to better understand this process by specifying ways in which social movement organizations within the same movement may influence one another through indirect network ties. More specifically, I show that a new tactic of protest, the shantytown, spread rapidly among U.S. campuses between 1985 and 1990. Recent advances in the modeling of diffusion in an event history framework allow me to test for the diffusion of this innovative strategy of protest among certain groupings of colleges and universities. Specifically, my results indicate that the tactic spread among colleges and universities with similar size endowments, of roughly the same level of prestige, and of the same institutional type. My analysis also indicates that high prestige, liberal arts colleges with smaller numbers of African American students had higher rates of shantytown protest.

From the early 1960s to the early 1990s, the issue of the immorality of the South African system of apartheid was a concern on college and university campuses throughout the U.S. Certainly the level of this concern had fluctuated in past decades, as indicated by the cyclical nature of the level of student anti-apartheid activism. Although the origins of the anti-apartheid movement on campuses dates back to the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the subsequent U.N. African Asian block boycott against South Africa, the movement was not especially successful until the mid-1980s (Jackson 1992; Loeb 1994; Vellela 1988). At this time, activists all over the country began protesting, demonstrating, signing petitions, building blockades and staging sit-ins in a concerted effort to encourage U.S. pension funds, insurance companies, and corporations to withhold their South Africa-related securities. Colleges and universities soon became the target

*I would like to thank Ron Breiger, Elisabeth Clemens, Doug Imig, Doug McAdam, Susan Olzak, David Strang, Sid Tarrow, Pam Tolbert, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this work. Please direct all correspondence to Sarah A. Soule, Department of Sociology, The University of Arizona, 437a Social Sciences Building, Tucson, AZ 85721. Email: soule@arizona.edu.

of this student movement, as student activists urged them to divest of South Africa-related securities.¹

It is not particularly surprising that students participated in the anti-apartheid movement. The humanitarian goals of the movement attracted widespread support. Nor is it especially startling that students targeted their own universities in their divestment demands given that colleges were indeed holding securities associated with South Africa. What is interesting about this student movement, however, is the emergence and diffusion of a new protest tactic: the shantytown. Not only did students employ the well-established repertoire of student protest (sit-ins, petitions, demonstrations, rallies, blockades), but they also developed a new protest tactic that spread rapidly to campuses all over the country. Campus activists in many locales adopted this tactic because of both its perceived effectiveness at encouraging colleges and universities to divest and its resonance with the living conditions of many black South Africans (Vellela 1988; Weiner 1986). One student leader remarked:

For the campus divestment movement, 1985-86 was the year of the shanties, makeshift structures disrupting the campus landscape of tidy quadrangles and plazas, symbolizing the viciousness of apartheid and the oppression of South Africa's blacks. [The shantytowns] have appeared not only at schools with long radical traditions, like the University of Wisconsin, Reed College, and Columbia University, but also in unexpected places like the University of Utah, the University of Florida at Gainsville and Purdue University (Weiner 1986:1).

Experimentation with new protest tactics or the revitalization of tactics used in an earlier period is not peculiar to the student divestment movement. In fact, this tendency has been noted in numerous scholarly works (McAdam 1983; Snow & Benford 1992; Soule & Tarrow 1991; Tarrow 1989, 1994; Tilly 1978, 1993; Zolberg 1972). However, the imitation and diffusion of innovative protest tactics has received less scholarly attention due to the tendency for scholars to treat social movement organizations as discrete entities, ignoring the connections or linkages between them (McAdam & Rucht 1993; Meyer & Whittier 1994). Recently a number of scholars have challenged the notion that social movement organizations are bounded entities and have noted that challenging groups not only influence their direct target, but also influence other social movement organizations both in other movements and in other countries (McAdam & Rucht 1993; Meyer & Whittier 1994; Soule 1995; Soule & Tarrow 1991; Tarrow 1993). This article extends this line of research to within-movement diffusion in the US. Drawing on the theoretical and analytical treatment of diffusion, I use data on the student divestment movement between 1985 and 1990 to shed new light on how indirect channels of diffusion serve as a mechanism for diffusion of protest tactics within this U.S. social movement.

The event history models employed in this article allow for the examination of two separate sets of questions, the first about student activism in
general and the second about the diffusion of the shantytown. I first test hypotheses about the characteristics of colleges and universities that increase the rate of student divestment activism. My findings suggest that higher-ranked, liberal arts campuses with smaller enrollments of African American students had higher rates of shantytown protests. These findings are consistent with past research on student movements. Second, I test models about the process of diffusion of this innovative protest tactic. My results indicate that the shantytown diffused most rapidly between colleges and universities of the same institutional type, with similar levels of prestige, and with similar endowment sizes.

The Shantytown

In early 1985, news reports from South Africa flooded U.S. newspapers describing the government-ordered beatings and shootings of peaceful demonstrators. More than 5,000 people in South Africa had already been killed as a result of the increasing levels of political violence, a number that would rise to over 11,000 five years later (American Committee on Africa 1990). There was increasing concern in the US about the brutal repression of political activism in South Africa and about the system of apartheid, more generally. This concern sparked activism in the US which gradually made its way to college campuses (Vellela 1988).

At Columbia University in April of 1985, student leaders staged a blockade of Hamilton Hall, the main administration building of the university. The blockade was described as “covered with sitting, sprawling, hunkering students, maybe two hundred of them, debating, laughing, reading, conferring and establishing a presence. Armchairs and sofas dragged out from a near-by dormitory offered some comfort. Tarps were rigged up to provide shelter; blankets covered some who slept” (Vellela 1988). The blockade lasted almost three weeks, culminating in a speech by Reverend Jesse Jackson which drew over 5,000 additional participants (Hirsch 1990; Loeb 1994). The incident at Columbia received a great deal of attention due to its sheer size and visibility as well as its duration (Vellela 1988).

Unknown to them, the student leaders at Columbia had started a trend. Shortly after this event, students at Princeton staged a “camp out,” as did students at the University of California in Santa Cruz (Vellela 1988). Students at Harvard University held a “sleep-in” at the university’s library and students at the University of Iowa camped out in front of the administration building which they renamed “Biko Hall” (Lacey 1985). Students at a number of other universities held “sit-outs”, a modification of the more familiar tactics of the sit-in and blockade (Vellela 1988).

The sit-outs, camp-outs, and sleep-ins marked the beginning of the evolution of a new protest tactic, an innovation in the student repertoire of contention. Later in the spring of 1985, students at Cornell University al-
tered this innovative form of protest by collecting scraps of wood, tar paper, and plastic that were used in the construction of a shack in front of the administrative offices of the University. Dubbed the "Karl Marx House" and used as a place for meetings, the shack was the first of what later became known as the shantytown (Vellela 1988). Within days, the university administration ordered the removal of the shantytown. After several forced dismantlings of the shack which were followed by several rebuildings by the students and a decision by the Cornell faculty to join the students in their protest, the administration finally acquiesced; the Karl Marx House was allowed to remain standing. The Cornell students and some sympathetic faculty members celebrated their small victory over the administration.

Media attention to the Cornell University students' successful use of this new protest tactic encouraged students at other universities to experiment with the construction of similar structures. Late in the spring of 1985, a one-day shanty appeared at the University of Washington and by the fall of 1985, students at the University of Vermont and Middlebury College had erected shantytowns emblazoned with pro-divestment slogans (Vellela 1988).

Nevertheless, the shantytown tactic of protest was not always met with great hospitality and acceptance by the university community. In December of 1985, Dartmouth College's shantytown was attacked by a displeased campus faction, members of the student group called "The Committee to Beautify the Green." While the protesters slept inside of the shack, student members of the campus group destroyed the structures with sledgehammers (Vellela 1988). Although student activists saw the conservative countermovement against the shantytowns at Dartmouth as a formidable setback to the cause of Dartmouth's divestment, it was crucial to the student divestment movement as a whole. The attacks on the shanties at Dartmouth brought a great deal of media attention to the divestment movement. Students across the country could hardly help but hear, at least tangentially, about the movement and about the new tactic of the shantytown, thus the tactic began to spread.3

The shantytown was perceived as a successful tactic by student activists because it was not only a disruption on campuses, but was also symbolic of the living conditions of many Black South Africans (Vellela 1988; Weiner 1986). Demonstrators embraced the shantytown as the "next step up" from the other forms of protest employed by student activists because of its "constant, nagging presence" on campuses (Christian Science Monitor, 26 Nov., 1985). Moreover, many students and faculty members across the country believed that they had a "moral advantage" in that it was easy to "gain support for the notion that apartheid is wrong" (Newsweek, 16 May, 1985:61).4 Hence, the tactic was relevant to both the immediate goal of the movement (divestment) as well as to the broader goals of ending apartheid in South Africa.5
Flexible Repertoires of Contention, Modularity, and Tactical Spillover

Tilly (1978, 1986, 1993, 1995) defines the *repertoire of contention* as the entire set of tactics or actions a group of actors uses to assert different claims. During any given period the repertoire is quite limited, given the unbounded set of actions or tactics a group could, at least in theory, employ (Tilly 1978). Repertoires are historically specific and reflect the “cultural expectations” of the period; in other words, the repertoire is what actors “know how to do and what others expect them to do” (Tarrow 1993:70).

Tilly (1978) states that social movement organizations often employ *flexible repertoires* of contention which permit the observation of other groups’ tactics and the subsequent modification of the forms of group collective action. By imitating forms of collective action used by other activist groups, a social movement organization may increase its effectiveness. When one social movement organization uses a particular form of protest successfully, others are more likely to employ this tactic (Oberschall 1989; Tilly 1993, 1995). Social movement activists “do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict. Rather, they often find inspiration elsewhere in the ideas and tactics espoused and practiced by other activists” (McAdam & Rucht 1993:58). This borrowing or imitation of forms of protest leads to the diffusion of a tactic and the “waves” of certain types of protest (Soule & Tarrow 1991; Tilly 1978).

The fact that this occurs in the absence of direct communication between actors may be explained by Tarrow’s (1993, 1994) concept of *modularity*. Tarrow (1993; 1994) argues that the modern repertoire of contention may be used by a variety of different actors in a whole host of different situations, against a number of different targets (Tarrow 1993; 1994). The result of the modular repertoire is that modern activists in disparate locations with minimal organization and without direct linkages are able to unite in national social movements (Tarrow 1993). In other words, the modular repertoire is indirect and consists of tactics of protest that can easily be transferred from setting to setting, by groups of social actors who are not engaged in face-to-face discussion.

Germane to discussions of innovation and diffusion of tactics is the notion that social movement organizations are not bounded entities and that they not only influence their challengers but also influence other movement organizations. Two recent studies have examined this important idea in depth. McAdam and Rucht (1993) present the case of the German and American New Left and argue that both direct and indirect ties between activists led to the *cross-national diffusion* of tactics, slogans, frames, and ideologies within this movement. In a similar vein, Meyer and Whittier’s (1994) term *social movement spillover* refers to the fact that the ideas, tactics, frames, participants, and organizations of one movement often diffuse into other movements. They study this phenomenon by examining the impact of the Women’s Movement on the Peace Movement; a case of *inter-movement diffusion*. Both of these studies agree that social movement
organizations are not "self contained and narrowly focused unitary actors" (Meyer & Whittier 1994:277). I extend the work of McAdam and Rucht (1993) and Meyer and Whittier (1994) by examining the diffusion of the shantytown within the U.S., a case of intramovement diffusion.

Tilly's notion of the flexible repertoire of contention helps to explain why new tactics of protest diffuse. McAdam and Rucht (1993) and Meyer and Whittier (1994) specify arenas in which elements of movements may diffuse and Tarrow's concept of modularity helps us to explain the process of diffusion in the absence of direct ties. The obvious next task is to specify exactly how new tactics diffuse in the absence of direct ties.

**Diffusion Theory: Relational and Nonrelational Models**

When social scientists speak of diffusion they very broadly mean the "flow of social practices among actors within some larger system" (Strang & Meyer 1993). The use of the term social practices, refers to anything from childrearing to agricultural practices, religious symbols to welfare policies, urban riots to aircraft hijacking. According to Rogers (1983), diffusion occurs when some "innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system" (14). Theories of diffusion maintain that there are two types of channels along which innovations flow: direct (or relational ties) and indirect (or cultural linkages).

As should be evident from the preceding discussion, definitions of diffusion almost always include the notion of connectedness. The aspect of diffusion most used by social scientists is the direct connection or channel between actors in a social system (Strang & Meyer 1993). Relational models of diffusion maintain that information flows between actors through their direct network relations. The rate at which an item diffuses varies with the level of interaction between actors so that at high levels of interaction between a "prior" and "potential" adopter, there should be higher rates of diffusion of innovations.

Social science research has benefited greatly from relational models of diffusion. Research has found that direct network ties facilitate the diffusion of an antibiotic (Coleman, Katz & Menzel 1966), innovations in agriculture (Hagerstrand [1953] 1967), resistance to the Versailles army (Gould 1991), and mobilization of trade unions (Hedstrom 1994).

Despite the varied and thorough research conducted on how innovations spread between directly connected actors, one must not disregard diffusion amongst actors that are not directly connected. Several researchers have asked why it is that unconnected actors display high degrees of homogeneity in form, structure, ideology, and practice and how it is that innovations on these dimensions spread between actors who are not connected in any obvious manner. Strang and Meyer (1993) dub such indirect connections "cultural linkages." Essentially, actors or groups of actors are said to have ties simply because they belong to a common social category.
McAdam and Rucht (1993) call these cultural linkages "non-relational channels of diffusion." Like Strang and Meyer (1993), McAdam and Rucht (1993) argue that diffusion should be rapid amongst a set of potential adopters who define themselves as similar to the transmitters (McAdam & Rucht 1993).7 The higher the level of identification with a shared social or cultural category, the more extensive the transmission of an innovation.8 Non-relational models of diffusion specify the process by which an innovation is adopted by actors in the absence of direct, network ties.9 Social science research has also benefited from nonrelational models of diffusion. Indirect ties have been shown to facilitate diffusion of violent collective action (Pitcher, Hamblin & Miller 1978), antinuclear demonstrations (McAdam & Rucht 1993), peace protests (Guigni 1995), barricades (Soule & Tarrow 1991), airplane hijacking (Holden 1986), and university policy (Soule 1995). In a similar vein, I argue that indirect or nonrelational linkages between divestment activists on disparate campuses led to the spread of the shantytown tactic.10

The collective identity formed by student anti-apartheid activists is an important form of indirect channel of diffusion. Students look to other students and identify with them, hence the process of collective identity formation with student activists on other campuses led to the diffusion of the shantytown. This is illustrated by the student activist at Boston College who remarked, "A year ago, two years ago, well, it was "we'll do our thing on our campus," but now they're really looking outward to other campuses to see what they can learn, and see how they can help" (Vellela 1988:30).11 The process of identification with other student activists should occur most readily amongst student activists who have higher levels of collective identity. I expect that students at similar colleges and universities will have higher levels of identification with one another, hence the protest tactic of the shantytown should diffuse most rapidly among campuses that are similar on certain dimensions. In the following section I elaborate on some of these dimensions of similarity.

Diffusion of Protest Tactics

As stated in the previous section, the diffusion of the shantytown protest tactic relied on indirect linkages between students on different campuses. Certainly there may have been some minimal communication between activists on different campuses, however I argue that the spread of the shantytown tactic occurred in large part because of the construction of a collective identity among student activists. Students saw media images of other students on similar campuses across the country building shanties and identified with them, imitating their evidently effective protest strategies.

I argue that five different socially constructed categories are relevant to the diffusion of the shantytown protest tactic. First, I expect to see higher
rates of diffusion within groups of similar institutions. For example, I expect to find evidence of diffusion amongst all liberal arts colleges or all research institutions. Second, I expect to see evidence of diffusion amongst colleges and universities within the same region as activists looked to geographically similar institutions. This may have in part been due to local media attention to the shantytown which should have increased the rate of diffusion within a region by providing information about the tactic. Third, I expect to see diffusion between colleges and universities of roughly the same prestige level. Here, students at campuses of roughly the same prestige were more likely to identify with one another hence the shantytown should have diffused more rapidly. Fourth, I expect that students at historically black colleges identified with students at other black colleges, and therefore aided in the spread of the shantytown tactic. Oberschall (1989) argues that during the 1960s, the protest tactic of the sit-in spread most rapidly amongst black colleges due to the competition between these colleges and the resultant imitation of competitors. It will be interesting to see if the same process holds true in the 1980s. Finally, I expect that the shantytown tactic spread amongst colleges of the same endowment size, or of the same level of wealth. Students at wealthier colleges may have viewed the protest tactics aimed at similar colleges as especially salient to their own movement, hence I expect to find evidence for the diffusion of tactics within endowment level.

Structural Characteristics of Colleges and Universities and Activism

In addition to questions about the diffusion of protest tactics, I investigate the structural characteristics of colleges and universities and how these affected rates of shantytown protests. One of the most consistent findings regarding student activism is that it is much more likely to take place on large campuses (see review in Van Dyke 1994). For example, Lipset (1971), Blau and Slaughter (1971), and Van Dyke (1994) have shown that larger colleges and universities were more likely to have had student protest in the 1960s. This article examines whether or not the same process holds true in the 1980s during the student divestment movement.

A second consistent finding in the study of student activism is that ‘elite’ institutions are far more likely to experience activism (Bloom 1987; Feuer 1969; Lipset 1971; Orbell 1971; Van Dyke 1994). Lipset (1971) argues that the ‘best’ colleges historically have witnessed higher levels of student protest. As determined by faculty prominence and research, these colleges attract a disproportionate number of “intellectually oriented students,” who are the very students who call themselves “activists” (Lipset 1971). Furthermore, colleges and universities with higher admissions standards are more likely to host student protest (Lipset 1971). The analysis presented below addresses whether or not elite colleges had higher rates of protest in the 1980s as well.
A third empirical finding is that African American students were far less likely than their white counterparts to have participated in the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Lipset 1969, 1971). McAdam (1988) finds that applicants and participants to the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project were disproportionately white. Loeb (1994) argues that the student movements of 1960-80 (including the student divestment movement) were also dominated by white students. Certainly, the impression obtained from reading the newspaper accounts of the shantytown protests is a movement dominated by white students (Soule 1995). Does this impression hold true in a more rigorous empirical test?

According to the central tenets of resource mobilization theory, one resource that is necessary for collective action is preexisting activist organization (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The degree of existing organization is crucial to potential mobilization (Freeman 1973; Oberschall 1989; Tilly 1978). Van Dyke (1994) finds that the presence of existing activist networks on a campus strongly increases the probability of student activism during the civil rights movement. Existing activist networks are an important resource for potential activists, hence leading to the empirical observation that certain colleges and universities are “activist schools.” A related argument is found by Lipset (1971), who claims that the “political reputations of certain schools may be linked to sources of selective recruitment” (89). Hence, leftist colleges may draw leftist students which may lead to higher rates of collective action. In this article I ask whether the level of leftist student organization on a campus increased the rate of shantytown protests.

In a second attempt to address the importance of preexisting network ties to activism, I ask whether or not the presence of an African/African American/black studies department (from this point on referred to as “black studies department”) on a campus increased the rate of shantytown protests. In at least one notable case, Columbia University, the student divestment movement was affiliated with such a department and grew out of an African American students’ association (Lacey 1985; Loeb 1994).

Based on the research of Lipset (1969, 1971) and Blau and Slaughter (1971), one might expect that liberal arts colleges have higher rates of shantytown protests. Lipset (1971) argues that “high level liberal arts institutions with an intellectual aura attract students oriented to becoming intellectuals” (89). Again, intellectually oriented students are more likely to participate in student activism (Lipset 1969, 1971). Similarly, Loeb (1994) contends that the generally lower levels of student activism between 1975 and 1985 may be attributed to the declining proportion of undergraduate students seeking liberal arts education. In this article I ask whether or not Liberal Arts colleges in the U.S. had higher rates of shantytown protest.

Last, some scholars have noted a relationship between geographic region and student activism. Lipset (1971) has shown that the student protest of the late 1960s was least likely to have occurred in the Southern regions of the U.S., a finding also discussed in the work of Sherkat and Blocker
McAdam (1988) finds that educational institutions located in New York and the Great Lakes regions of the country had higher rates of participation in Freedom Summer than did institutions located elsewhere. This article investigates whether or not colleges and universities located in certain regions of the country had higher rates of shantytown protest.

Data Description

The dependent variable in this analysis is the timing of shantytown events at US four-year colleges and universities. Data is obtained from newspapers using NEXIS. This advanced data collection technique involves employing the system to scan all newspaper articles from 37 different newspapers and news agencies. By indicating various key words or concepts, the system rapidly scans news articles as far back in time as indicated. The system allows the researcher to read the articles in their entirety and to code event data. Using NEXIS to scan for news stories on shantytowns allows one to locate many of the events that might have been missed by using other methods of data collection such as an index to a particular newspaper. NEXIS allows the researcher to scan many more and varied newspapers in a short period of time, allowing for a more thorough data collection than was ever before possible.

In all, there are 46 shantytown events between 1985 and 1990. A shantytown event may be defined as the erection of a makeshift structure, constructed of various building materials, in protest of the university's economic involvement in firms with ties to South Africa. Often professing broader claims such as the problem of international human rights violations, the shantytown events coded here professed clear statements about the necessity of university divestment.

The population consists of all four-year, nondenominational, nonprofessional colleges and universities in the US that had some form of investment in South Africa (N= 899). I have excluded specialty and professional colleges such as: chiropractic colleges, podiatry schools, medical schools, theological seminaries, rabbinical institutes, and vocational training programs.

Most of the data for the independent variables in this analysis come from the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), which is widely available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). From HEGIS, I have longitudinal data on the size of each of the colleges and universities as measured by the enrollment size and the racial breakdown of this enrollment.

HEGIS also lists eight separate geographic regions in which educational institutions are located: New England, Great Lakes, Plains, Far West, Southwest, Southeast, Middle East, and Rocky Mountain. These eight regions were each recoded into eight separate binary variables.
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching provides a classification of institutions into four categories, each with two levels: Liberal Arts, Comprehensive, Doctoral Granting, and Research (Boyer 1987). These four institution types were recoded into four separate dichotomous variables.

Information on whether or not the institution has a Black Studies Program was obtained from Peterson's Guides to Four Year Colleges, for 1985 and 1988. These two years were selected to represent the beginning and near-end of my period. These are also dummy variables. In 1985, 13.1% of the sample had one of these programs, while in 1988, 11.6% did so.

From the Gourman Report: A Rating of Undergraduate Programs in American and International Universities, I have taken the Gourman rating. The Gourman rating is based on a continuous scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest. The Gourman Report considers a score of 4.41 or higher to be "strong," a score between 4.01 and 4.40 to be "good," a score between 3.51 and 3.99 to be "acceptable," a score between 3.01 and 3.50 to be "adequate," and a score between 2.01 and 2.99 to be "marginal." The sample considered here has a mean Gourman rating of 3.30.

Last, I have data on the degree of leftist organization on a campus. For each of the 899 institutions in the sample, I have consulted college guides such as Peterson's and Birnbach (1984) to ascertain the level of minority and gay student organization on campus. Although this is a rather subjective measure, it is nonetheless important to arguments about resource mobilization.

Modeling Diffusion

Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is adopted by members of a discrete population. Essentially, the previous adoption of an innovation by a member of the population alters the probability of adoption for the remaining, nonadopting population members (Strang 1991). Diffusion has obvious applicability to the social sciences but is unfortunately quite difficult to model empirically.

Conventional diffusion models have made two general assumptions about the population being studied. First, they assume spatial homogeneity, or that each and every member of the defined population has the same probability of influencing and being influenced by other population members (Strang 1992; Strang & Tuma 1993). Here, all actors are equally susceptible and equally infectious. Second, these conventional models assume temporal homogeneity, or that the influence of the prior adoption of an innovation on potential adopters does not vary with the length of time since the adoption of the innovation (Strang 1992; Strang & Tuma 1993). Here, the likelihood of adopting an innovation neither increases nor decreases with time since the last adoption in the population.
Quite clearly, these two assumptions are unrealistic when we conceptualize the diffusion of many social processes, such as a protest tactic. It seems counterintuitive to assume that all universities are equally likely to experience a shantytown protest. It also seems counterintuitive to assume that the probability of having a shantytown protest is not at all affected by the recent existence of these events in a population or a subset of the population (e.g., within a particular region). The emphasis on temporal and spatial homogeneity in diffusion models has occurred mainly because most current methodological tools are not appropriate for the study of heterogeneity of a population (Strang 1991). Conventional models of diffusion are conceptualized at the population level, making it difficult to relax assumptions of spatial and temporal homogeneity.

Generally, conventional models are based on the how rapidly the size of the adopting population changes (Strang 1991). A review of these conventional models discusses the prospects of relaxing the two rather unrealistic assumptions of spatial and temporal homogeneity (Bartholomew 1982). However, it is shown that at the population level, doing this produces intractable mathematical formulations that are not easily or efficiently applied to actual empirical problems (Strang & Tuma 1993).

Strang and Tuma (1993) and Strang (1991), however, have proposed a new set of diffusion models that avoid these sticky assumptions. By shifting the level of analysis to the individual actor rather than the population, Strang and Tuma (1993) are able to model the “probability of each individual’s adoption, at each point in time, as a function of the individual’s proximity to the sources of diffusion” (Strang 1992:16). In other words, the rate of adoption of an innovation by an actor is a function of the adoption rate of other, related actors. These are referred to here as individual-level heterogeneous diffusion models and they incorporate both spatial and temporal heterogeneity. Event history analysis is the appropriate method to estimate these models, as it allows for the analysis of data on both the timing and the sequence of all changes at the individual level. Furthermore, current maximum likelihood estimation techniques are sufficient to estimate event history models efficiently.

One type of individual-level heterogeneous diffusion model is the multiplicative model of diffusion discussed in Strang and Tuma (1993) which allows for the inclusion of a set of independent variables to measure the direct relationships as in a traditional event history regression model, which are referred to as the propensity effects, as well as three different vectors of variables. First, proximity effects are those which are the actual effects of diffusion and which incorporate both spatial and temporal heterogeneity. Second, susceptibility incorporates the notion that some actors in a system are more vulnerable to the actions of other actors in a system. Third, infectiousness incorporates the idea that the actions of certain actors are more important to the diffusion process. Because these models are cast in an event history framework, I am also able to model the decay in the influence of particular events as time passes (Strang & Tuma 1993). The multiplica-
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tive model (in the absence of time dependence and temporal heterogeneity) is:

\[ r_n(t) = \exp \left( \alpha x_n + \sum_{s \in E_n(t)} \beta v_s + \sum_{s \in E_n(t)} \gamma w_s + \sum_{s \in E_n(t)} \delta \right) \]

Where \( n \) is the potential adopter, and \( s \) is the transmitter. The vector, \( x_n \), is that of the direct effects of structural covariates on the outcome (propensity). The vector, \( v_s \), is that of the susceptibility effects of the adopter. The vector, \( w_s \), is that of the infectiousness effects of the transmitter. The vector, \( z_{ns} \), is that of the proximity (diffusion) effects of pairs of spreaders and potential adopters. The parameter estimates for each of these elements are denoted by \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \) and \( \delta \).

This article uses the propensity and proximity vectors to test hypotheses about diffusion of the shantytown and about the characteristics of colleges and universities that led to higher rates of shantytown protests. It should be noted that these two vectors measure quite different types of influence. While the propensity vector measures the direct effect of noncontagious influence on the rate of shantytown protest, the proximity vector measures the effect of social proximity of transmitters and potential adopters (Greve 1995; Greve, Strang & Tuma 1995). The proximity vector, then, refers to intrapopulation characteristics.

As mentioned above, current maximum likelihood techniques are the proper estimation technique for these event history models (Strang & Tuma 1993). The basic data structure for event history analysis consists of the spell. The spell is the observation time of an individual case and is delineated by the beginning point of the observation and the time at which the event of interest occurs (the end of the spell). If no event (here, a shantytown) occurs for this case, the spell is right censored. The maximum likelihood estimator used in my analysis takes right censoring into account (Kalbfleisch & Prentice 1980). A spell is left censored when it is not known when the spell actually begins. To deal with this, spells are defined as beginning in January of 1985, 4 months prior to the first shantytown event.

For right censored data, the logarithm of the likelihood is

\[ \log L = \sum_{n=1}^{N} d_n \log r_n(t) + \log G_n(t,t_0) \]

where \( d_n \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the spell is not right censored, and \( G_n(t,t_0) \) gives the probability that the event has not occurred at time \( t \). The models discussed in this article were estimated using the Interactive Matrix Language in SAS.
Results and Discussion: The Diffusion of the Shantytown

Again, I investigate two different research questions in this article: first, what are the characteristics of colleges and universities which increase the rate of shantytown protest and, second, is there evidence of diffusion of this tactic. If so, among what types of educational institutions does this tactic diffuse? Table 1 presents the analysis of the investigation of the structural characteristics of colleges and universities that increase the rate of shantytown protest. For this table, model 1 is the baseline model to which all other models in Table 1 will be compared. The three models in Table 1 show results of terms in the propensity vector of the multiplicative model discussed above, and should be interpreted as one would a traditional event history regression model.26

Across models 1 through 3, the percentage of African American students decreased the rate of shantytown protests.27 This finding is consistent with the findings presented in Lipset (1969, 1971). During the civil rights movement, white students were more likely than their black counterparts to participate in student protest. This is also consistent with McAdam’s (1988) findings about the participants in the 1964 Freedom Summer Project who were nearly all white. Perhaps most importantly, however, this finding is consistent with the impressions given by the media about the student anti-apartheid movement of the mid-1980s. The news accounts of the student divestment movement portray a movement comprised largely of white students; a finding consistent with Loeb (1994). In addition, the presence of a black studies department on a campus did not significantly increase the rate of protest.

Models 1 through 3 in Table 1 also show that institutions ranked higher by Gourman had higher rates of shantytown protests. An interpretation of this coefficient shows that the multiplier for a first university ranked 2 by Gourman is 29.4, while that of a second university ranked 3 by Gourman is 159.1. In other words, the multiplier for the second university is more than five times greater than that of the first.

This finding is also consistent with Lipset (1971, 1969) and Van Dyke (1994), who argue that during the student protest wave of the 1960s, colleges that attracted the most ‘intellectually oriented’ students and had the highest admissions standards were those that had the highest levels of protests. McAdam (1988) also finds that applicants to and participants in the Freedom Summer Project were mainly from elite universities.

Model 3 indicates that liberal arts colleges have higher rates of shantytown protests. The positive and significant coefficient of .91 indicates that liberal arts colleges, relative to all other types of colleges, had higher rates of shantytown protest between 1985 and 1990.28 Lipset (1971, 1969) argues that there is a strong relationship between academic discipline and student protest. Student activists, says Lipset, are most likely to be students of humanities and social sciences (and not of hard sciences, and “applied fields”). This is in part due to the fact that students in humanities and so-
TABLE 1: Structural Characteristics of U.S. Colleges and Universities and the Rate of Shantytown Protests, 1985-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Propensity vector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-8.93 (.54)***</td>
<td>-8.89 (.56)***</td>
<td>-11.05 (1.07)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrollment (In)</td>
<td>.14 (.05)***</td>
<td>.14 (.06)***</td>
<td>.06 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage African American</td>
<td>-5.11 (2.08)**</td>
<td>-5.10 (2.09)**</td>
<td>-5.21 (2.3)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black studies department</td>
<td>-.03 (.09)</td>
<td>-.02 (.09)</td>
<td>-.10 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourman rank</td>
<td>1.51 (.10)***</td>
<td>1.52 (.11)***</td>
<td>1.69 (.12)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of leftist student organization</td>
<td>-.01 (.06)</td>
<td>-.03 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal arts</td>
<td></td>
<td>.91 (.25)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td>.15 (.11)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>10.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vs. baseline model)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vs. baseline model)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01

Social sciences are more likely to come from well-to-do backgrounds and are more likely to be from intellectual families, two other characteristics of the student activist of the 1960s (Lipset 1971; Sherkat & Blocker 1994). It appears that this finding holds true in the 1980s as well.

Model 3 also shows that institutions located in the Northeast had a higher rate of shantytown protest, perhaps because many of the early shantytowns were at colleges and universities located in this region. This might also have something to do with the fact that a number of mobilizing groups such as the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and the Africa Fund are located in the Northeast and it may have made it easier to mobilize students at nearby colleges and universities.

Models 2 and 3 show that the degree of leftist student organizations did not increase rates of protest, although the coefficient is never significant. This unexpected finding may be partially explained by the measurement of this variable which is rather subjective. Perhaps a better measurement of this would be one similar to that used by Van Dyke (1994) for an earlier period.
TABLE 2: The Diffusion of Shantytowns, 1985-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Propensity vector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-12.05 (1.07)***</td>
<td>-10.92 (1.10)***</td>
<td>-10.40 (1.12)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrollment (In)</td>
<td>.06 (.08)</td>
<td>.04 (.08)</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage African American</td>
<td>-5.36 (2.3)**</td>
<td>-5.30 (2.34)**</td>
<td>-5.04 (2.31)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black studies department</td>
<td>-.11 (.10)</td>
<td>-.13 (.10)</td>
<td>-.14 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourman rank</td>
<td>1.78 (.14)***</td>
<td>1.57 (.15)***</td>
<td>1.42 (.16)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of leftist student organization</td>
<td>-.03 (.05)</td>
<td>-.01 (.05)</td>
<td>-.001 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal arts</td>
<td>.90 (.24)**</td>
<td>1.05 (.27)**</td>
<td>1.01 (.27)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>.16 (.11)</td>
<td>.14 (.11)</td>
<td>.17 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximity vector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.005 (.0002)***</td>
<td>.004 (.0003)***</td>
<td>.003 (.0004)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution type</td>
<td>.002 (.0005)***</td>
<td>.002 (.0005)**</td>
<td>.001 (.0005)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourman level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.001 (.0005)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio</td>
<td>-23.71***</td>
<td>28.83***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are in parentheses.

* p < .10    ** p < .05    *** p < .01

Table 2 presents the analysis of the second set of research questions on diffusion of the shantytown. In model 1 in Table 2, we see that the intercept in this baseline diffusion model is positive and significant, indicating a pattern consistent with diffusion. In model 2 of Table 2, we see that there is a positive effect of diffusion within institutional type. Student activists at liberal arts colleges look to student activists at other liberal arts colleges for cues on protest tactics. Collective identities are more easily formed among students at colleges and universities similar on this dimension.

Model 3 of Table 2 shows that there is also a positive effect of diffusion within similar categorical levels of Gourman rank (referred to as the Gourman level). This represents a slightly different vantage point from which to view processes of institutional diffusion. In addition to the indi-
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TABLE 2: The Diffusion of Shantytowns, 1985-1990* (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propensity vector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.77 (1.13)***</td>
<td>-10.40 (1.20)***</td>
<td>-10.13 (1.13)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrollment (In)</td>
<td>.04 (.08)</td>
<td>.02 (.09)</td>
<td>.01 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage African American</td>
<td>-4.52 (2.19)**</td>
<td>-5.83 (2.51)**</td>
<td>-5.83 (2.50)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black studies department</td>
<td>-.19 (.11)</td>
<td>-.15 (.10)</td>
<td>-.16 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourman rank</td>
<td>1.52 (.16)***</td>
<td>1.45 (.16)***</td>
<td>1.44 (.17)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of leftist student organization</td>
<td>-.009 (.05)</td>
<td>-.003 (.06)</td>
<td>-.004 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal arts</td>
<td>1.14 (.27)***</td>
<td>.94 (.28)***</td>
<td>.93 (.27)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>.38 (.13)***</td>
<td>.38 (.11)***</td>
<td>.38 (.12)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      |                 |                 |                 |
| Proximity vector     |                 |                 |                 |
| Constant             | .004 (.0005)*** | .003 (.0006)*** | -.05 (25.2)     |
| Institution type     | .002 (.0005)*** | .002 (.0005)*** | .002 (.0005)**  |
| Gourman level        | .001 (.0005)*** | .001 (.0005)*** | .001 (.0005)**  |
| Region               | -.004 (.001)*** | -.003 (.001)*** | -.003 (.001)*** |
| Endowment level      | .002 (.0005)*** | .002 (.0005)*** | .002 (.0005)**  |
| Black colleges       | .05 (.25)       |                 |                 |
| Likelihood ratio     |                 |                 |                 |
| (vs. baseline)       | 41.0**          | 56.0**          | 56.09**         |
| Degrees of freedom   | 3               | 4               | 5               |

* Standard errors are in parentheses.

p <.10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

rect linkages between students at colleges and universities of the same type, it appears that prestige level acted as another category within which indirect ties between students may have functioned as a diffusion mechanism.

In model 4 of Table 2, there is a negative effect of diffusion within region. Student activists seem not to imitate the student activists within their own region. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive. The attention
given to student activism in the local media would almost seem to insure
diffusion within region. The negative effect of regional diffusion is probably
indicative of asymmetry. In other words, this may mean that students in all
regions look to one or two particular regions for innovative protest tactics.
Alternatively, it might be the case that in some regions where there are few
shantytown events, it appears that the tactic diffuses rapidly, based only
on these few events. Another interpretation of this is that the tactic of the
shantytown diffuses within certain regions, but not within other regions,
leading to the negative coefficient on this term. 50

Model 5 of Table 2 provides evidence that there is diffusion within
endowment level. Students at institutions with similar levels of endow-
ment look to students at similar institutions for cues on the repertoire of
contention. Like institutional type and prestige level, students at colleges
and universities similar to one another on this dimension more easily forge
collective identities hence the tactic diffuses more rapidly.

Another interesting finding presented in model 6 in Table 2 is the in-
significant effect of diffusion among historically black colleges. Notice,
however, that the coefficient is relatively large, as is the effect of the con-
stant in the proximity vector. Although, at first glance, one might conclude
that the hypothesized effect is not supported, one must be cautioned
against such a premature conclusion. The large increase of the constant
(relative to the baseline model) in conjunction with a large but insignifi-
cant diffusion effect has been found in simulated data when the diffusion ef-
fect is actually quite large (Greve, Strang & Tuma 1995). Thus, it may be the
case that the actual contribution to the hazard rate of the diffusion within
black colleges is rather high. Certainly, if Oberschall (1989) is correct, it
would make sense that tactics of protest diffuse rapidly amongst black
colleges.

Conclusions

Tilly has argued that tactical innovations which are perceived as effective
are likely to be imitated by other actors, thus to diffuse between social
movement organizations. Tarrow’s concept of modularity helps to explain
how tactical diffusion occurs in the absence of direct communication be-
tween actors.

The shantytown tactic drew its effectiveness from two different
sources. First, it was perceived as an effective means of disruption on
campuses that led to the eventual adoption of divestment policies by col-
leges and universities. Second, it was perceived as effectively drawing at-
tention to the poor living conditions of black South Africans, hence high-
lighting the immorality of the system of apartheid. I argue that this per-
ceived effectiveness led to the diffusion of the shantytown across campuses
in the 1980s.
Central to my argument is the notion that social movement organizations are not isolated entities oblivious to the actions and tactics of other social movement organizations. Rather, they are constantly engaged in the monitoring of other organizations either directly (through direct communication or network ties) or indirectly (through cultural linkages or indirect communication and the media). I expand on the ideas of McAdam and Rucht (1993) and Meyer and Whittier (1994), who discuss both the cross-national and the intermovement diffusion of frames, tactics, ideas, slogans, and organizations, to include the intramovement diffusion of a successful protest tactic.

This article presents two different sets of results. First, I test general hypotheses about which colleges and universities have higher rates of shantytown protest. Second, I test for diffusion of the shantytown within a number of categories of educational institutions.

As expected, I find that colleges and universities with lower African American enrollments had higher rates of shantytown protests, much like activism in the 1960s. I also find that elite, liberal arts colleges in the Northeast had higher rates of shantytown protests, a conclusion consistent with previous findings. Surprisingly, the relationship between institutional size and the rate of shanties was never significant (although the coefficient is in the expected direction). Colleges and universities with black studies departments and with high levels of leftist student organization did not have higher rates of shantytowns. This runs counter to the predictions of the resource mobilization perspective which would lead us to believe that networks formed by either black studies departments or leftist student organization would insure higher rates of protest and student activism.

My results also show that, generally, the shantytown as an innovative protest tactic diffused rapidly among certain categories of colleges and universities. It appears that the tactic spread most rapidly amongst those of the same institutional type. In addition, the shantytown spread rapidly between student activists at colleges and universities within similar levels of endowment and Gourman ranking. Students at wealthy colleges look to students at other wealthy colleges and students at institutions of roughly the same prestige (as ranked by Gourman) look to one another. These findings lend support to notions of indirect or socially constructed ties, as the innovation diffuses most rapidly among similar institutions. These results, when taken together, indicate that socially constructed categories of similarity lead to the diffusion of an item, here a protest tactic.

Diffusion analysis is important to the study of social movements and this article has attempted to show one application of these models. The model discussed in this article has a great applicability to the study of social movements as it is cast in an event history framework which is familiar to many scholars of social movements and collective action. Moreover, the model allows for the development and testing of arguments about collective identities, nonrelational diffusion, and reference groups; concepts central to the study of social movements.
APPENDIX A: Divestment Mobilization

I. Source

1. Name of source:__________________________
2. Date and page of article:__________________
3. Other sources in which event appears:____________________

II. Event information

4. College/university involved:____________________________
4a. FICE CODE_________________________________________
4b. City and state________________________________________
5. Date of event (start and end if possible):__________

III. Magnitude of event

6. Number involved:_________ Number of arrests:____________
7. Police involvement (when no arrests made): ____ yes ____ no

IV. Organization

8. Names of student organizations:_____________________________
9. Were faculty members involved? ____yes ____ no
10. Number of faculty members involved?____________________

Notes

1. Disinvestment refers to actions taken by businesses to sever their economic ties to South Africa, and divestment refers to actions on the part of the university to sell off South African-related securities.
2. It is important to note that the shantytown had been used historically by activists during other social movements such as the Depression-era “Hoovervilles” and by Reagan-era homeless activists. However, this was a new tactic for student divestment activists. Certainly one could make claims about diffusion between different social movements, in this article, however, I am looking at diffusion within a movement.
3. My narrative account of the diffusion of the shantytown protest tactic is quite similar to Oberschall’s (1989) discussion of the spread of the 1960’s sit-ins. In both of our accounts, repression and the resultant media attention act as catalysts for the diffusion process.
4. Hirsch’s (1990) study of the divestment movement at Columbia University indicates that activists who participated in the blockade were clearly convinced that “apartheid was evil, divestment would help South African blacks, and that divestment could be achieved through protest” (252).
5. It is interesting to note that although businesses and local governments were also invested in South Africa, universities became the primary target of student activism. The early protests were indeed directed at noneducational entities, however the shantytown was exclusively a campus phenomenon. This may in part be due to the fact that colleges provided the physical space for the shantytown. Moreover, college students (especially those at residential colleges) are physically available for the sort of protest that involves sleeping in a shantytown. As mentioned earlier, although the tactic of the shantytown had been used by other social movements, in earlier periods, it resonated with the physical space of the campus and the lifestyle of residential students.

6. A social movement organization is a group of actors, following a similar belief system, acting in concert to promote change (Tilly 1978).

7. This is much like the notion of reference groups. For example, Greve (1995) employs the same family of models discussed here to show how radio stations imitate other stations within their own reference group leading to the abandonment of the easy-listening format.
APPENDIX C: Cumulative Frequency of Shantytown Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. The notion of collective identities is useful here. Klandermans (1992) argues that, at the most general level, individuals belong to groups and "to the extent that they identify with these categories, they come to share the beliefs of others within the same category" (94). Activists in one locale, then, may come to identify with activists elsewhere or even in a different movement altogether. Via the formation of this collective identity, ideas and beliefs (and even tactics) are more readily transferred.

9. Burt's (1987) work has popularized a similar concept that was first used by Lorrain and White (1971), "structural equivalence." This is the state in which two unrelated actors or groups of actors occupy the same network position with respect to a third actor.

10. There is some support for the hypothesis that student groups across the country were actually directly linked. In fact, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) actually hired a student coordinator to facilitate communication between different campus groups through the circulation of the Student Anti-Apartheid Newsletter (Vellela 1988). There is also evidence that the coordination attempts were somewhat successful. For example, on 4 April, 1985, students all over the country staged protests, rallies, and sit-ins in support of university divestment (Vellela 1988). This particular day was very much an effect of coordination efforts. I do not completely reject the argument that students were directly tied during the divestment movement, but I argue that these ties were not strong enough to explain the spread of the shantytown through direct communication. Instead, I stress the importance of nonrelational or indirect channels to the diffusion of the shantytown.

11. The media discourse, Gamson (1989) argues, is crucial to the process of collective identity formation in that it is one of the chief sources of ideological packages. Mass media allows social movement organizations to publicize their issues without actually publishing their own messages and aides in the recruitment of new members to a movement (Kielbowicz & Scherer 1986). McAdam and Rucht (1993) argue that one of the greatest sources of indirect diffusion is the modern media.

12. It is important to note, as does McAdam (1988), the higher rates of activism on elite campuses may be due to organizational intent of student organizers. Divestment organizers may have strategically placed large protests, such as the previously described demonstration at Columbia University, to draw more media attention and perhaps more participants. It is not possible to empirically examine this phenomenon with my data, but this issue is worth noting.

13. Please see Appendix A for the coding mechanism used to collect this data.

14. Please see Appendix B for a list of these 37 newspapers.

15. Examples of the key words used in data collection are "shantytown," "divestment," "student protest," "anti-apartheid," and "apartheid."

16. There is a long tradition in the study of social movements of using newspapers as a data source on collective action events. For a review of the possible problems with newspaper event data, see Paige (1975) and Olzak, Shanahan, and West (1994).
17. See Appendix C.

18. Shantytowns were a highly visible form of protest, often evoking a repressive response from the university community. In several cases, a shantytown was disassembled by either the administration or by counterprotesters. One such notable case was discussed earlier. At Dartmouth College, there was a large countermovement against the shantytowns, which became particularly explosive when the shantytowns were attacked by sledgehammer-wielding students. Another notable case occurred at Yale University, when an angry alumnus returned to the campus and burned down the shantytowns. Often, these shantytowns were rebuilt. I have not considered the case of rebuilding of a shantytown a new event. I am only considering the timing of the first shantytown event on a campus. The use of subsequent events biases the analysis, as an institution known to have had a prior shantytown may be at a different level of risk than those institutions that have not witnessed the protest tactic.

19. Since the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) is administered about every five years, I use techniques of linear interpolation to estimate data for the years between the measurement years.

20. A liberal arts institution is defined as a primarily undergraduate college which emphasizes baccalaureate degree programs and awards more than 40% of its degrees in the liberal arts fields. A comprehensive institution offers a full range of baccalaureate degrees, but also offers master's degrees. These award 40 or more master's degrees in 3 or more disciplines each year. A doctoral granting institution also offers a full range of baccalaureate degrees, but also awards at least 40 doctoral degrees each year. Last, a research institution offers a full range of baccalaureate degrees and awards doctoral degrees, but also is committed to research. This institution must award over 50 doctoral degrees and receive at least $15.5 million dollars each year in federal support (as described in the National Science Foundation's annual report, Federal Support to Universities, Colleges and Non-Profit Institutions.)

21. This rating takes the following 14 criteria into account: control and organization of institution, total degrees conferred and educational programs offered, age or experience level of institution, qualifications of faculty, student records, difficulty of admission, size of student body, content of curriculum, teaching load, quality of administration, quality of nondepartmental areas such as counseling and career placement, quality of physical plant, finances of institution, and the quality of the library.

22. The Gourman ranking is the only ranking available for such a large number of universities over time and has been used in social science research in the past (Eckberg 1988).

23. Several universities traditionally thought to have a great deal of student activism are coded here as such. Among these are Berkeley, Michigan, Wisconsin, Reed, Brandeis, Harvard, and Oberlin.

24. For a review of the individual and population level models, see Strang (1992).

25. Greve, Strang, and Tuma (1995) present the results of Monte Carlo simulation studies which examine the estimation issues of the diffusion model. Among other issues, the authors examine cases where one covariate affects the hazard rate in more than one manner. For example, it is not difficult to conceptualize that Gourman Rank (prestige) may affect the hazard rate of shantytown protest directly and that diffusion may occur between colleges and universities of similar levels of prestige. The logic of including the covariate in more than one vector is conceptual. However, this raises the question of collinearity which the authors address. Greve, Strang, and Tuma (1995) conclude that "Multiple effects of a single variable (and by implication, high correlations among conceptually distinct measures) do not impede estimation when the effects are located in different parts of the model" (416).

26. Appendix D is the plot of the hazard rate for shantytowns. The hazard rate is the instantaneous probability of experiencing an event at any given point in time. A plot of the hazard function is used as a diagnostic tool.

27. An interpretation of the coefficient in model 3 of Table 1 for this covariate (-5.21) shows that the multiplier for a campus with 5% African Americans is .77 and for a cam-
pus with 25% African Americans is 0.27. In other words, increasing the percentage of the African Americans on a campus from 5% to 25% decreases the multiplier on the rate of shantytown protest by 0.50.

28. An interpretation of this coefficient indicates that, relative to other types of colleges and universities, liberal arts colleges had rates of shantytown protest 2.5 times greater.

29. It is important to differentiate between including the binary variable for location in the Northeast in the propensity vector and the variable for region in the proximity vector. The former tests for whether or not Northeastern colleges and universities had higher rates of shantytown protests, while the latter tests for whether or not the tactic diffused between colleges and universities located in the same region.

30. Another explanation for this finding is that it is possible that activists at several regionally proximate colleges combined their divestment activism to one campus. Although plausible, I was not able to find evidence of this in news accounts of the shantytown protests. However, it is worth considering this as a possible explanation for the lack of evidence for regional diffusion of this protest tactic as news accounts may not have been able to discern students at one college from students at another college. With the data presented in this article, however, it is not possible to ascertain whether or not a college of university's shantytown was constructed by students from other colleges or universities.

References


Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1969. “American Student Activism.” In Gary R. Weaver and James H. Weaver. The University and Revolution. Prentice Hall.


NEXIS Online Database. Produced by Mead Data CentraL Dayton, Ohio. Updated Daily.


